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Abstract
This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the implications
that complementary assets needed for the formation of start-ups – proxied by the
ease of access to financial resources – have on the innovative efforts of incumbent
firms. In particular, we develop a theoretical model, highlighting a strategic in-
centive effect by which the innovative efforts of incumbent firms are decreasing
in the availability of the complementary assets needed for the creation of a start-
up. The empirical relevance of this effect is investigated by using firm level data
drawn from the third Italian Community Innovation Survey covering the period
1998-2000. The results of our empirical analysis support our theory-based insights.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued that the knowledge embodied in firms’ employees is an important
vehicle for the diffusion of technology. Indeed, there is broad empirical evidence show-
ing that technological change in many industries is fostered by the entry of start-ups
created by former employees of incumbent firms (see, e.g., Klepper and Sleeper, 2005,
and Klepper, 2010). In this context, to the extent that the knowledge of ‘key’ em-
ployees can not be fully appropriated by an incumbent (for instance, because it is to
some extent tacit knowledge)1, the threat of creating a new firm may distort incum-
bents’ incentives to invest in innovative activities. The effects of employee mobility on
firms’ innovative efforts has been investigated in the literature. In particular, Franco
and Filson (2006) develop a dynamic industry model with endogenous R&D effort in
which spin-out firms can be started by former employees of incumbents. Using data
from the disk drive industry, they also show that taking this channel into account helps
explaining the pattern of start-ups formation and firms survival. Similarly, the theo-
retical work by Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003a,b) points to the importance of worker
mobility for firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. Indeed, they show that R&D incentives
under price competition are larger than under quantity competition in the presence of
endogenous spillovers stemming from worker mobility, while the converse is true when
worker mobility is neglected. As in our model, in these papers the innovation effort of
firms is endogenous. However, our main focus here is on the effects of the availability
of complementary assets for incumbents’ R&D investment, an issue that has not been
considered by this literature.
Starting with Teece (1986), a number of authors have pointed out the importance
of different types of complementary assets for the creation of new firms2. Numerous
examples of complementary assets, which are critical for the successful commercializa-
tion of new technologies, have been given in the literature. These include expertise and
infrastructure for product development, manufacturing, legal, sales, distribution and
customer service activities, as well as access to capital markets (see, e.g. Rothaermel
and Hill, 2005, Park and Steensma, 2012). An example of complementary asset that
1Zucker et Al. (1998), among others, have noted that the commercialization of innovative technolo-
gies (such as biotechnologies) is largely affected by the fact that the underlying relevant knowledge is
tacit. From a theoretical perspective, Spulber (2012) investigates the role of tacit knowledge in the
trade-off between entrepreneurship and technological transfer.
2A different stream of literature studies the potential creation of start-ups by focusing on ex-ante
and ex-post contracting between an incumbent firm and a key employee in the presence of weak (or
absent) property rights (see, among others, Anton and Yao, 1994, 1995, and Anand and Galetovic,
2000).
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has received most attention in the literature is the availability of financial resources and
especially venture capital. For instance, the country reports of the European Innova-
tion Scoreboard, published annually by the European Commission, regard early stage
venture financing as a key indicator of the innovation potential of a region. These re-
ports also show that the availability of such assets differs substantially between regions
and present the reduction of barriers for accessing them as an objective of innovation
policies. The effect that a reduction in the barriers to start-up formation might have on
the R&D investments of incumbent firms is however hardly understood and typically
not considered in this discussion.
In this paper, we investigate the effects of complementary assets availability on
the innovative efforts of incumbent firms and on the creation of start-ups by former
employees. In our model an incumbent invests in R&D generating new knowledge that
is – at least partly – embodied in a key employee, who can possibly exploit it to create
a new firm (a start-up). If the employee leaves the incumbent to create a start-up, the
incumbent suffers a loss both because it cannot fully appropriate the returns from its
R&D efforts (as it looses the share of knowledge remaining with the employee), and
because a new competitor enters the industry. Eventually, the creation of a start-up is
conditional on the availability of complementary assets and on the market demand the
new start-up expects to face. The size of this demand is unknown when the firm decides
about its R&D investment, where an increase in investment shifts the distribution of
demand realizations upwards. Before the key employee decides whether to form the
start-up or not, the size of the demand for the potential start-up firm is revealed to
her. The employee exits the firm and generates a start-up if her expected profit, which
takes into account the costs of accessing the necessary complementary assets, exceeds
her current income in the incumbent firm. When the needed complementary assets are
easily available in the market, the value of the employee’s outside option is large, which
results in an increase in the ex-ante probability that a start-up is formed. Therefore,
the incumbent’s incentives to invest in R&D are reduced.
Our explanation of incumbents’ innovative efforts as a function of the availability of
complementary assets required for start-up formation builds essentially on a strategic
argument: the more easily available complementary assets are, the higher the value of
key employees outside option is and the lower the incentives of incumbents to invest
in R&D are. Quite obviously, however, a number of other factors may be at work,
possibly entirely offsetting the negative strategic effect outlined above. For instance, in
a static perspective, non-compete clauses (or other covenants allowing the key employee
to credibly commit ex ante not to leave the firm), as well as the design of schemes
protecting intellectually property deriving from innovative activities, may be effective
3
in allowing the incumbent to fully appropriate the benefits of its innovative efforts.
However, clauses of this type are likely to be ineffective in several cases: indeed, there
is a large literature stating that non-compete covenants are not always enforceable
(see, e.g., Fallick et Al., 2006), and property rights over R&D knowledge are often
weak or absent (see, e.g., Anton and Yao, 1994, 1995). This is especially true when the
knowledge acquired by key employees is to a large extent tacit, which is often the case
in highly innovative sectors (see Zucker et Al., 1998, for the biotechnology industry,
and Fallick et Al., 2006, for the computer industry).
Perhaps more important, in a dynamic perspective, start-up formation contributes
to the creation of local clusters of firms, and there is robust evidence that the gen-
eration of knowledge in a cluster has positive knowledge externalities for the other
firms in the cluster. Hence, the incumbent may benefit from the existence of a local
cluster originated by the creation of start-ups ( see, e.g., Colombo et Al., 2012 for an
analysis taking into account this effect). Jaffe et Al. (1993) and Audretsch and Feld-
man (1996), among others, show that technological spillovers across firms are likely to
emerge when firms are geographically concentrated. Although we emphasize the role
of knowledge externalities, it is well known that several other types of (positive and
negative) externalities are relevant in clusters; see, e.g., Hanson (2001).
All these factors – that are likely to have a bite in practice – are neglected by
our model, focusing entirely on the incentive effects stemming from the impact of
the incumbent’s decisions on the key employee’s outside options. One may therefore
question whether our arguments are of large practical relevance, or whether the trade-
off between the negative incentive effect we highlight and the direct effects of start-
up formation (favoring the emergence of industrial clusters, and generating positive
externalities through local technological spillovers) should be resolved unambiguously
in favor of the latter.
The second part of this paper addresses exactly this issue. After introducing in
Section 2 a stylized model and deriving our main theoretical result, we bring the model
to the data (in Section 3), to check whether the negative strategic relationship between
the innovative efforts of established firms and the availability of complementary assets
is of any empirical relevance. In particular, we investigate whether – ceteris paribus
– there exists an inverse relationship between the availability of complementary assets
(proxied in our analysis by the availability or lack of financial resources experienced
by new entrants) and the R&D expenditures by incumbents.3 The results of our em-
3As discussed above, the availability of the financial resources needed to start and develop a new
company (be it in the form of bank loans, private equity, or venture capital) is a key factor in all
industries to gain access to the complementary assets that are needed for start-up formation. Hence,
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pirical analysis (in Section 4) strongly support our theoretical claim that the R&D
intensity of incumbents is – ceteris paribus – negatively correlated with the availability
of complementary assets.
2 The model
We consider an incumbent firm acting as a monopolist for his product and facing
an inverse demand curve pF (q,K), where q denotes output quantity and K is the
knowledge stock of the firm determining the quality of the product. We make the
following (standard) assumptions concerning p:
∂pF
∂q
< 0,
∂pF
∂K
> 0,
∂2pF
∂q∂K
≥ 0, ∂
2pF
∂K2
< 0. (1)
Furthermore, we assume that for any given quantity q the price pF (q,K) exhibits
constant elasticity with respect to K. Marginal costs of production are normalized
to zero. The profit of the firm when it produces the optimal quantity is denoted by
piF (K). In order to build the knowledge stock K, the firm has to make the investment
I(K) in R&D, with I ′(K) > 0 and I ′′(K) > 0 for K ≥ 0. The knowledge stock is
embodied in a key R&D employee of the firm, and it is assumed to be partly tacit. In
case the employee leaves the firm, only a fraction δK, with 0 < δ < 1, of the generated
knowledge is retained by the firm.
Upon leaving the firm, the R&D employee might use her knowledge stock K to
found a start-up company. In order to do so, complementary assets are needed, which
are provided by a third party who keeps a fraction 1 − γ of the profits generated by
the start-up. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) can therefore be interpreted as a proxy of the
availability of complementary assets in the considered industry.
The more easily available complementary assets are, the lower the fraction of the
start-up’s profit accruing to the provider. The net profit of the former R&D employee
following start-up formation is given by
JE(K; γ) = γpiS(K)− C,
where piS(K) denotes the profit of the start-up firm and C are the costs borne to found
the start-up, which include the opportunity costs of the former employee’s wage income
at her former employer. It is assumed that the inverse demand for a product offered
by a start-up cannot be as clearly anticipated as that of a pre-existing firm and it is
we use this indicator as a proxy for the easiness of accessing complementary assets and founding a
start-up.
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always below that of an incumbent who has the same knowledge stock K. In other
words, having been in the market for longer gives an advantage to the incumbent. In
particular, we assume that the start-up faces the stochastic inverse demand curve
pS(q,K) = ξpF (q,K),
where ξ is uniformly distributed in [0, ξ¯] with ξ¯ < 1. This implies piS(K) = ξpiF (K).
Furthermore, it is assumed that the effect of the entry of the start-up firm on the
demand for the product of the incumbent is negligible, and therefore the profit of the
incumbent firm after the formation of the start-up is given by piF (δK).4
The following timing of events is considered.
1. The incumbent invests in order to generate the knowledge stock K.
2. The key employee learns the realization of the stochastic variable ξ.
3. The employee leaves the incumbent and she forms a start-up if and only if
JE(K; γ) > 0. In this case, only a knowledge stock of δK remains within the
incumbent firm.
4. The incumbent and the start-up (if it has been founded) realize their profits.
The assumption that the key employee learns the exact value of ξ in step 2., and
therefore the exact form of the demand function he would face when founding a start-
up is quite strong. However, nothing in the analysis changes if we assume that the key
employee just receives a signal about the demand and ξpF (q,K) denotes the inverse
demand curve expected by the employee after receiving this signal.
The incumbent firm F chooses its R&D investments in order to maximize its ex-
pected pay-off taking into account the possibility for the employee to leave the firm
and form a start-up. Formally, the problem of the incumbent can be written as
max
K≥0
JF (K; γ) :=
[
piF (K)(1− v(K; γ)) + piF (δK)v(K; γ)− I(K)] , (2)
where v(K; γ) = P(JE(K; γ) > 0) denotes the probability that a start-up firm is
formed.
4Colombo and Dawid (2013) consider a setup where the incumbent and the start-up compete in
a common market. The analysis carried out in that paper shows that the main qualitative insights
obtained under the simplifying assumption made here extend to such a setting with more involved
strategic interaction.
6
In order to guarantee the concavity of the objective function in (2), we assume that
the following inequality holds for all K ≥ 0
I ′′(K) > piF ′′(K)(1−v(K; γ))−2piF ′(K)v′(K; γ)+δ2piF ′′(δK)v(K; γ)+2δpiF ′(δK)v′(K; γ).
(3)
This condition requires that the marginal costs of producing knowledge grow suf-
ficiently fast with K to dominate any non-concavity of the expected market profit of
the incumbent with respect to changes in the knowledge stock. It is also convenient to
define with (K) = Kpi
F ′(K)
piF (K)
the elasticity of piF with respect to K. The dependence of
this elasticity from the knowledge stock is characterized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Under assumptions (1) the elasticity (K) is increasing with respect to K.
Proof. Taking into account that the firm is choosing the profit maximizing monopoly
quantity qm(K) for each K, it follows from the envelope theorem that
piF
′
(K) =
∂pF (qm(K),K)
∂K
qm(K).
Hence,
(K) =
1
pF (qm(K),K)
K
∂pF (qm(K),K)
∂K
.
Taking the derivative with respect to K we obtain
′(K) =
1
pF (qm(K),K)2
[[(
∂2pF
∂K2
+
∂2pF
∂K∂q
∂qm(K)
∂K
)
K +
∂pF
∂K
]
pF+
− K∂p
F
∂K
(
∂pF
∂K
+
∂pF
∂q
∂qm(K)
∂K
)]
=
1
pF (qm(K),K)2
[(
K
∂2pF
∂K2
+
∂pF
∂K
)
pF −K
(
∂pF
∂K
)2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (due to constant elast. of p)
+
+
1
pF (qm(K),K)2
[
∂2pF
∂K∂q
pF − ∂p
F
∂K
∂pF
∂q
]
K
∂qm(K)
∂K
> 0
The last inequality follows from assumptions (1) and the observation that ∂q
m(K)
∂K > 0,
which is implied by the assumption of constant elasticity of pF with respect to K.
The optimal solution of the maximization problem (2) is denoted by K∗(γ). The
following Proposition shows our main result, namely that the optimal investment in
R&D of the incumbent firm decreases as complementary assets become more easily
accessible.
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Proposition 1 Assume that (3) holds. Then, K∗(γ) is decreasing in γ for all γ such
that K∗(γ) > 0.
Proof. Observe first that due to the global concavity of (2) for all γ such that
K∗(γ) > 0 the optimal solution of the profit maximization problem is determined by
the first order condition
piF
′
(K)(1−v(K; γ))−piF (K)v′(K; γ)+δpiF ′(δK)v(K; γ)+δpiF (δK)v′(K; γ)−I ′(K) = 0.
Implicit differentiation of this condition with respect to γ yields
∂K∗
∂γ
= −
∂2JF (K∗;γ)
∂K∂γ
∂2JF (K∗;γ)
∂K2
,
where JF (K; γ) denotes the objective function of firm F given in (2). Due to (3) we
have ∂
2JF (K∗;γ)
∂K2
< 0 such that the sign of ∂K
∗
∂γ is equal to that of
∂2JF (K∗;γ)
∂K∂γ . Considering
this expression, we get
∂2JF (K∗; γ)
∂K∂γ
=
∂v
∂γ
(
δpiF
′
(δK)− piF ′(K)
)
+
∂2v
∂γ∂K
(
piF (δK)− piF (K)) .
Furthermore, since ξ is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we have that
v(K; γ) = 1− C
ξ¯γpiF (K)
,
and therefore
∂v
∂γ
=
C
ξ¯γ2piF (K)
∂2v
∂γ∂K
= − Cpi
F ′(K)
ξ¯γ2piF (K)2
.
Overall, this gives
∂2JF (K∗; γ)
∂K∂γ
=
C
ξ¯γ2piF (K)
[
δpiF
′
(δK)− piF ′(K)− pi
F ′(K)
piF (K)
(
piF (δK)− piF (K))]
=
CpiF (δK)
Kξ¯γ2piF (K)
[
δKpiF
′
(δK)
piF (δK)
− Kpi
F ′(K)
piF (K)
]
=
CpiF (δK)
Kξ¯γ2piF (K)
((δK)− (K))
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.
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To gain an economic intuition for this result it should be realized that the sign of
the relationship between K∗ and γ depends on the sign of the cross derivative of the
incumbent’s objective function with respect to K∗ and γ. The observation that K∗ is
decreasing in γ is equivalent to the statement that the marginal increase of the objective
function given in (2) becomes smaller as γ is increased. An increase of γ has two effects
on the derivative of JF with respect to γ. First, increasing γ increases the probability
v(K; γ) that a start-up is formed and, since the marginal return from additional R&D
investment for the incumbent is smaller if a start-up is formed compared to the case
where the employee stays in the firm, this effect reduces ∂J
F
∂K . The second effect is
less straightforward. Increasing γ affects also the size of the marginal effect of K on
the probability of start-up formation. Increasing K makes the probability of start-up
formation higher and this reduces the incentive of the incumbent to invest in K. If
this disincentive is reduced by increasing γ then this second effect would contribute
to a positive relationship between K∗ and γ and, if dominant, it could imply that
K∗(γ) is an increasing function. However, in Proposition 1 it is shown that under our
assumptions the first direct effect is always dominant and therefore the incentives to
invest in R&D decrease if the availability of complementary assets goes up.
3 Data and key variables
In order to empirically test the relevance of the result in Proposition 1 of Section 2, we
use firm-level microdata drawn from the third Italian Community Innovation Survey
(CIS), conducted over a three-year period (1998-2000) by the Italian National Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT).5 This survey is representative of the entire population of Italian
firms with more than 10 employees, at both the sector, regional and the firm size level.
In more detail, the CIS 3 dataset adopts a weighting procedure that relates the sample
of firms interviewed to the entire population (ISTAT, 2004).6 The dataset comprises
5CIS surveys are nowadays systematically collected every three-years in most European countries
(as well as in extra-European countries, such as Korea). Surveys run in different periods slightly differ
in the design of the questionnaire and/or in the disclosure policy of some of the variables .For our
purposes, the CIS 3 survey is the more complete among the ones currently available. It is important to
note that the different CIS surveys are conducted independently, with the only aim to be representative,
with no attention to the longitudinal dimension of the data. Therefore, each survey is largely composed
by different firms and no panel data are currently available.
6Firm selection is carried out through a “one step stratified sample design”. The sample in each
stratum is selected with equal probability and without reimmission. The stratification of the sample
is based on the following three variables: firm size, sector, regional location. Technically, in the
generic stratum h, the random selection of nh sample observations among the Nh belonging to the
entire population is realized through the following procedure: (i) a random number in the 0-1 interval
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a set of general information (industry of affiliation, group belonging, turnover, em-
ployment, exports) and a set of innovation variables measuring firms’ innovativeness,
subjective evaluations of factors hampering or fostering innovation, participation in
cooperative innovation activities and access to public funding. The response rate was
53%, determining a full sample size of 15,512 firms, both in manufacturing and service
sectors.
As far as the focus of our paper is on innovative companies, we only keep firms
declaring Research and Development expenditures (R&D) greater than zero (2,308
companies). Furthermore, in order to identify incumbent and start-up firms in each
industry, we use the 1994 year of foundation to discriminate between the two sub-groups
(incumbent are identified as founded before 1994, young start-up companies as created
in 1994 or afterwards).7 This step - due to missing values in the year of foundation -
slightly reduces the number of available observations to 2,124. Finally, as we assume
that spin-offs are specific to a given industry and affected by sectoral complementary
assets (see previous section), we use a rather detailed sectoral criterion in assigning
firms to a given industry by adopting a three-digit industrial classification.8 To have
a representative number of start-ups in each three-digit industrial sector, we exclude
observations/industries with less than three start-ups. We end up with a sample of
1,721 innovate firms, of which 1,337 are incumbent and 384 young start-ups.
In order to empirically test the result of Proposition 1, we use the incumbent sub-
sample as the R&D investors we are interested in, while the start-up sub-sample is used
to get the information concerning the perception of the role of industrial complementary
assets in affecting new firm formation based on innovation. Therefore, in the following
econometric analysis, on the one hand we consider as dependent variable the R&D
investments by the incumbent firms, normalized by sales in order to control for the
is attributed to each Nh population unit; (ii) Nh population units are sorted by increasing values
of the random number; (iii) units in the first nh positions in the order previously mentioned are
selected. Estimates obtained from the selected sample are very close to the actual values in the
national population. The weighting procedure follows the Eurostat and Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997)
recommendations: weights indicate the inverse of the probability that the observation is sampled.
Therefore, sampling weights ensure that each group of firms is properly represented and correct for
sample selection. Moreover, they help reducing the heteroskedasticity commonly arising when the
analysis focuses on survey data.
7As far as the age of the firms in the ‘start-up’ sub-sample is concerned, the 5 years threshold is
chosen to solve the trade-off between a lower age and the representativeness of the sub-sample of young
companies. With our selection procedure we end up with about 22% of the entire sample as start-ups.
8We use NACE rev.1.1 industrial classification and consider industrial three-digit disaggregation.
Represented industries are reported in the Appendix, Table A1.
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scale effect due to the different size of the investigated firms.9 On the other hand, our
main impact variable (the regressor representing the role of complementary assets in
affecting the possible decision by an R&D employee to use her knowledge to spin-off)
is measured by the perception of young start-ups of the lack of financial sources as an
obstacle to innovation. More in detail, this variable has been constructed on the basis
of the question 12.3 of the Italian CIS 3 questionnaire, asking: “how important was the
availability of finance as a constraint on innovation activities in influencing a decision
not to innovate?” (rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 4; 1 = high, 4 = irrelevant/ not
experienced).10
According to our model, if the availability of financial resources is not an obsta-
cle for potential start-ups, R&D employees easily spin-off from incumbent firms and
incumbents – backwards – are not keen on investing in R&D. Therefore, we expect a
negative coefficient linking the availability of “complementary assets” (higher score of
our impact variable) with incumbents’ R&D investment.
CIS 3 provides further information on firms beyond their innovative activity. The
following estimates adopt some of these indicators as further controls; in particular,
we include four additional covariates in our specifications. The first accounts for a
firm’s access to policy support for innovation. A government subsidy or a fiscal incen-
tive should increase a firm’s innovative performance, although the empirical evidence
on this is quite controversial, due to the possible insurgence of crowding out effects,
displacing privately funded R&D investments (see Wallsten, 2000; Gonza´les et Al.,
2005; Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2012). The second controls for firms participating in
a cooperation agreement for innovation.11 The third accounts for firms adopting or-
ganizational changes, which might create an encouraging environment in the company
to make an innovation strategy more likely to be effective - especially in terms of
the overall productivity performance of the company.12 The fourth control looks at
a firm’s export propensity. Global competition can spur innovation and capabilities,
9No information about the knowledge stock is available in the CIS database. However, this is not a
problem within our model setting, where the R&D investment (I) is assumed to be positively correlated
with the knowledge stock (K). In fact, since I ′(K) > 0, to empirically show that incumbents’ R&D
investments and complementary assets (γ) are inversely correlated is equivalent to prove the obtained
result that the incumbents’ knowledge stock is decreasing with respect to γ.
10As discussed in the Introduction, a variety of complementary assets may be needed to create a
start-up, widely differing across industrial sectors. However, the availability of financial resources is
the key factor in gaining access to those assets in all industries
11The important role of cooperation agreements in affecting the innovative output of firms is high-
lighted by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Piga and Vivarelli (2004), and Fritsch and Franke (2004).
12See Schmidt and Rammer (2007). On the complementarity between technological and organiza-
tional change, see Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Bresnahan et Al. (2002), and Piva et Al. (2005).
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while technologically inactive firms are doomed to be excluded from the international
arena (see Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and Zanfei, 2003). Finally, our
econometric specification includes the four Pavitt’s sectoral dummies (Pavitt, 1984)
plus a ‘service-industries’ dummy in order to control for the different sectoral techno-
logical opportunity and appropriability conditions (on the role of the so-called ‘sectoral
systems of innovation’, see Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Breschi et Al., 2000).
Equation (4) describes the specification adopted for the empirical test.
log(R&D/SALES)i = C + β1Complementary Assetsi + β2Supporti (4)
+β3Cooperationi + β4Organizational Changei +
+Σβ5log(Export/Sales)i + ΣγkPavittki + i,
where C is the constant, i is the firm-index (incumbents), log(R&D/Sales) repre-
sents the innovative investments intensity, Complementary Assets is computed on the
evaluation of start-ups (in each three-digit industrial sector), Support, Cooperation,
Organizational change and log(EXPORT/SALES) (i.e.,export intensity) are the
control variables previously discussed, and Pavitt are the sectoral dummies (science-
based, scale-intensive, specialized-suppliers, services, with the suppliers-dominated firms
as the default category; k = 4). Note that, as it is common in the literature, contin-
uous variables are log-transformed both to smooth heteroskedasticity problems and to
mitigate the role of possible outliers.
4 The evidence
Table 1 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis and reports the corre-
sponding descriptive statistics.
< Insert Table 1: The variables – descriptive statistics about here >
The correlation matrix for the entire sample is reported in Table 2. As can be seen,
all the correlation coefficients are less than 0.359 showing that data are not affected by
serious collinearity problems.
<Insert Table 2: Correlation matrix about here>
12
Table 3 reports the econometric results of the estimates run on the 1,337 incum-
bent firms. Diagnosis tests (F-test and R-squared) are satisfactory, taken into ac-
count the cross-sectional nature of the data. Moreover, the estimation has been con-
trolled for both heteroskedasticity (using robust standard errors) and multicollinearity
(VIF=1.36).
<Insert Table 3: dependent variable: log(R&D/SALES); observations = 1,337 about
here>
Our results show a negative and significant impact of the availability of comple-
mentary assets (evaluated by start-ups) upon incumbents’ R&D intensity, which lends
considerable support to the theoretical claim of Proposition 1 in Section 2. Indeed, the
correspondent coefficient shows the expected (negative) sign, a high level of significance
(t-statistics equal to 2.33) and a considerable magnitude.
Turning our attention to the control variables, only the support for innovation
turns out to positively affect R&D intensity, while the other controls do not reveal any
significant impact.
Finally, focusing on the sectoral dummies and taking into account that the less
innovative supplier-dominated firms are the reference category, not surprisingly science-
based firms, followed by service companies and specialized suppliers, turn out to be
more R&D intensive (see the values and significance of the corresponding Pavitt’s
dummies).
5 Concluding remarks
Since innovation can be considered the main driver of economic growth, to investigate
the factors that are fostering or hampering R&D investment is relevant. The theoretical
model proposed in this paper claims that there is a strategic (negative) relationship
between the availability of the complementary assets needed for the creation of a new
firm and the innovative effort by incumbent firms. The evidence provided in the second
part of the paper supports this theoretical prescription.
An important implication of our analysis is that the evaluation of policy measures
aimed at reducing the barriers faced by potential start-up founders should not focus
exclusively on the induced effects on the frequency of start-up formation and the sub-
sequent success of these start-ups. Such an evaluation should also take into account
the negative effects that these policies might have on the R&D intensity of incumbents.
13
Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that such negative effects exist across dif-
ferent sectors and regions. How large and relevant they are for different specific sectors
and regions is an empirical issue open for future research.
Although the empirical results of this paper are consistent with the proposed the-
oretical model, our analysis is not immune from important limitations. First, both
the theoretical model and the empirical specification focus exclusively on a strate-
gic argument, while other factors may play a role, as discussed in Section 1. In this
perspective, accounting for possible clustering and learning effects would be valuable
extensions. Second, since complementary assets are specific to the single sectors, there
is a need for a data collecting purposely addressed to catch and measure those assets,
beyond the general availability of financial resources used in this paper. Third, the es-
timates in this study have a cross-sectional nature, while a dynamic specification would
have allowed to properly compute the knowledge stock and to obtain more robust re-
sults; in this context, a need for longitudinal CIS data clearly emerges as a preliminary
condition to extend the analysis through a dynamic test of the theoretical hypothesis
proposed here.
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Appendix
<Table A1: Three-digit sectoral classification – Incumbents and start-ups>
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Table 1: The variables – descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
R&D investment normalized by sales (year 2000) 0.028 0.058 
COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS = Likert-scale: 1 (lack of financial 
resource is a serious problem) to 4 (lack of financial resource is not 
an issue), as evaluated by young start-up firms 
2.928 0.473 
SUPPORT Dummy = 1 if the firm has received public support for 
innovation 
0.554 0.497 
COOPERATION Dummy = 1 if the firm takes part into 
cooperative innovative activities 
0.249 0.433 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE Dummy =1 if the firm has 
introduced organizational changes 
0.689 0.462 
EXPORT normalized by sales (year 2000) 0.278 0.292 
Pavitt sectoral dummies   
SB Dummy = 1 if science-based firm 0.185 0.388 
SI Dummy = 1 if scale intensive firm 0.137 0.344 
SS Dummy = 1 if specialized supplier firm 0.350 0.477 
SD Dummy = 1 if supplier-dominated firm 0.192 0.322 
SER Dummy = 1 if firm in service industries 0.136 0.343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
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COMP.ASSETS -0.108*         
SUPPORT 0.122* -0.066*        
COOP. 0.113* -0.041 0.177*       
ORG.CHANGE 0.012 0.022 0.026 0.103*      
EXP/SALES 0.040 0.071* 0.072* 0.007 0.028     
SI -0.086* 0.043 -0.037 -0.064* 0.008 -0.021    
SS -0.118* 0.183* 0.024 -0.061* -0.006 0.071* -0.292*   
SB 0.100* -0.359* 0.066* 0.130* 0.028 -0.000 -0.189* -0.349*  
SER 0.269* -0.025 -0.064* 0.093* 0.059* -0.054* -0.158* -0.291* -0.189*
Note: * significant at 5%, 
 
 
Table 3: dependent variable: log(R&D/SALES);  observations = 1,337 
 
  
CONSTANT -4.581*** (0.334) 
COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS -0.245** (0.105) 
SUPPORT 0.705*** (0.080) 
COOPERATION -0.037 (0.099) 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE -0.108 (0.081) 
Log(EXPORT/SALES) -0.261 (0.240) 
SB 1.063*** (0.131) 
SI 0.147 (0.130) 
SS 0.513*** (0.102) 
SER 0.641*** (0.190) 
  
F(9, 1327) 23.49*** 
R2 0.13 
 
Notes: - Robust standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
- No multicollinearity problems have been detected 
 
  
Table A1: Three-digit sectoral classification – Incumbents and start-ups 
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- Manufacturing of dairy products; 
- Manufacturing of other food prods; 
- Manufacturing of other textiles; 
- Manufacturing of knitted articles; 
- Manufacturing of other wearing app.; 
- Manufacturing of articles of paper; 
- Printing and service act. for printing; 
- Manufacturing of basic chemicals; 
- Manufacturing of paints, varnishes; 
- Manufacturing of pharmaceuticals; 
- Manufacturing of soap;  
- Manufacturing of other chemicals; 
- Manufacturing of rubber products; 
- Manufacturing of plastic products; 
- Manufacturing of glass; 
- Manufacturing of ceramic tiles; 
- Manufacturing of articles of concrete; 
- Other first processing of iron; 
- Manufacturing of non-ferrous metals; 
- Manufacturing of metal prods; 
- Treatment and coating of metals; 
- Manufacturing of other metal prods; 
- Manufacturing of machinery; 
- Manufacturing of other gen. p. mach.; 
- Manufacturing of machinetools; 
- Manufacturing of special p. mach.; 
- Manufacturing of office machinery; 
- Manufacturing of electric motors; 
- Manufacturing of electricity distrib.; 
- Manufacturing of insulated cable; 
- Manufacturing of electrical equip.; 
- Manufacturing of electronic valves; 
- Manufacturing of television & radio;  
- Manufacturing of medical equipment; 
- Manufacturing of instr. for measuring; 
- Manufacturing of indust. cont. equip.; 
- Manufacturing of optical instruments; 
- Manufacturing of bodies motor vehi.; 
- Manufacturing of parts motor vehi.; 
- Building and repairing of ships; 
- Manufacturing of motorcycles; 
- Manufacturing of furniture; 
- Manufacturing of gas; 
- Wholesale of household goods; 
- Wholesale of machinery; 
- Other supporting transport act.s; 
- Activities of travel agencies; 
- Monetary intermediation; 
- Software consultancy and supply; 
- Data processing; 
- Other computer related activities; 
- Research on natural sciences; 
- Legal,accounting,auditing activities; 
- Architectural/engineering activities; 
- Technical testing and analysis; 
 
 
INCUMBENTS 
 
       Code        Freq.   Percent      
        155 |         13        0.97        
        158 |         31        2.32        
        175 |         12        0.90        
        177 |         11        0.82        
        182 |         20        1.50        
        212 |         22        1.65        
        222 |         24        1.80        
        241 |         33        2.47        
        243 |         33        2.47        
        244 |         61        4.56        
        245 |         20        1.50        
        246 |         23        1.72        
        251 |         15        1.12        
        252 |         79        5.91        
        261 |         11        0.82        
        263 |         35        2.62        
        266 |         15        1.12        
        273 |         11        0.82        
        274 |          7        0.52       
        281 |         13        0.97       
        285 |         13        0.97       
        287 |         31        2.32       
        291 |         46        3.44       
        292 |         57        4.26      
        294 |         18        1.35       
        295 |         75        5.61       
        300 |         29        2.17       
        311 |         30        2.24       
        312 |         27        2.02       
        313 |          8        0.60        
        316 |         46        3.44       
        321 |         22        1.65       
        322 |         40        2.99       
        331 |         34        2.54       
        332 |         34        2.54       
        333 |         28        2.09       
        334 |         16        1.20       
        342 |         11        0.82       
        343 |         33        2.47       
        351 |          5        0.37        
        354 |         17        1.27       
        361 |         42        3.14       
        402 |          4        0.30        
        514 |          9        0.66        
        518 |          9        0.66        
        632 |          6        0.44        
        633 |          3        0.22        
        651 |         24        1.80       
        722 |         55        4.11       
        723 |          8        0.60        
        726 |          2        0.15        
        731 |         18        1.35       
        741 |          5        0.37        
        742 |         31        2.32       
        743 |          12        0.90        
------------+-----------------------        
Total |      1,337      100.00 
 
START-UPS 
 
      Code         Freq.  Percent    
        155 |          4        1.04        
        158 |         10        2.60        
        175 |          3        0.78         
        177 |          4        1.04         
        182 |          5        1.30         
        212 |          5        1.30        
        222 |          3        0.78        
        241 |         13        3.39       
        243 |          4        1.04        
        244 |          6        1.56        
        245 |          6        1.56        
        246 |          9        2.34        
        251 |          4        1.04        
        252 |         10        2.60       
        261 |          3        0.78        
        263 |          6        1.56        
        266 |          3        0.78        
        273 |          6        1.56        
        274 |          3        0.78        
        281 |          5        1.30        
        285 |          6        1.56        
        287 |          7        1.82       
        291 |         10        2.60       
        292 |         12        3.13       
        294 |          5        1.30        
        295 |         19        4.95       
        300 |         12        3.13       
        311 |          8        2.08        
        312 |          3        0.78        
        313 |          3        0.78        
        316 |         11        2.86       
        321 |         10        2.60       
        322 |         11        2.86       
        331 |         10        2.60       
        332 |          8        2.08        
        333 |          8        2.08        
        334 |          3        0.78        
        342 |          4        1.04        
        343 |          9        2.34        
        351 |          4        1.04        
        354 |          4        1.04        
        361 |          5        1.30        
        402 |          3        0.78        
        514 |          3        0.78        
        518 |          3        0.78        
        632 |          3        0.78        
        633 |          5        1.30        
        651 |         16        4.16       
        722 |         27        7.03       
        723 |          3        0.78        
        726 |          5        1.30        
        731 |          8        2.08        
        741 |          4        1.04        
        742 |         12        3.13       
        743 |          8        2.08        
------------+----------------------- 
      Total |        384      100.00 
 
